BackgroundPeople with upper extremity amputations report receiving insufficient information about treatment options. Furthermore, patients commonly report not knowing what questions to ask providers. A question prompt sheet, or list of questions, can support patient-centered care by empowering patients to ask questions important to them, promoting patient-provider communication, and increasing patient knowledge. This study assessed information needs among people with UE amputations about UE vascularized composite allotransplantation and developed a UE VCA-QPS.MethodsThis multi-site, cross-sectional, mixed-methods study involved in-depth and semi-structured interviews with (...) people with UE amputations to assess information needs and develop a UE VCA-QPS. Qualitative data were analyzed by thematic analysis; quantitative data were analyzed by descriptive statistics. The initial UE VCA-QPS included 130 items across 18 topics.ResultsEighty-nine people with UE amputations participated. Most were male, had a mean age of 46 years, and had a unilateral and below-elbow amputation. Participants desired information about UE VCA eligibility, evaluation process, surgery, risks, rehabilitation, and functional outcomes. After refinement, the final UE VCA-QPS included 35 items, across 9 topics. All items were written at a ≤ 6th grade reading level. Most semi-structured interview participants reported being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ likely to use a UE VCA-QPS.ConclusionPeople with UE amputations have extensive information needs about UE VCA. The UE VCA-QPS aims to address patients’ information needs and foster patient-centered care. Future research should assess whether the UE VCA-QPS facilitates patient-provider discussion and informed decision-making for UE VCA. (shrink)

Despite their purported demographic and institutional decline, White evangelical voters were instrumental in the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and even more so in his 2020 loss. The story of Trump’s electoral successes among Christian voters in the last two elections is in large part the story of religious nationalism—and White Christian nationalism in particular—because Trump personifies the convergence of nationalism-infused forms of messianism and apocalypticism intrinsic to White evangelicalism, which culminate in QAnon cultic ideology. However, these same ethnoreligious/nationalist (...) patterns and logics extend much further back than Trump’s insurgent candidacy. This chapter traces the recurring, resurgent patterns of “zombie nationalism” among White evangelical Christians in the United States over the last half century that emerged in response to periods of significant societal change and certain recurring sociopolitical issues. In particular, alongside established elective affinities around ethnicity (whiteness) and religion (Christianity), this chapter makes the case for incorporating gender and sexual politics as key factors in the articulation and legitimation of religious nationalism in the United States. White Christian nationalism tends to reemerge as a salient political force during periods of rapid social change and diversification, driven by racialized religious grievances symptomatic of Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment, or the paradoxical internalization and reprojection of a person’s or group’s perceived endangerment, victimhood, and/or suffering, in order to gain power. Drawing on examples of marriage equality and reproductive rights, this chapter demonstrates how an understanding of sexual politics is key to both apprehending and breaking the cyclical reanimation of White Christian nationalism. Escaping the nihilistic impulses driving these cycles will require White evangelicals to develop new hermeneutical tools capable of transforming the exclusionary patterns of racism, ethnocentrism, heteronormativity, and patriarchy that fuel the engine of ressentiment animating zombie nationalism. (shrink)

English summary: Max Weber's famous work Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismusm (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism) is published here in the same form as the original version dating from 1904 and 1905. In addition, it includes texts that emerged during the first controversy surrounding the work in the years 1907 to 1910, namely four criticisms and four counter criticisms. These are presented their unabridged form. The volume contains other texts from the between 1905 and (...) 1910 which are related to the subject matter covered in the study, such as the summary of Weber's lecture at a meeting of the Eranos Circle in spring 1905, his 1906 draft Kirchen und Sekten in Nordamerika (churches and sects in North America) and his contributions to a debate on a lecture by Ernst Troeltsch at the Erster Deutscher Soziologentag (first German conference of sociological studies) in 1910. The introduction provides an explanation of the historical context of the texts with regard to their content and publication, the editorial reports illustrate in particular Weber's selection and use of sources. The volume is complemented by several indices and a glossary. German description: Max Webers weltberuhmte Studie Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus wird hier in ihrer Fassung erster Hand aus den Jahren 1904 und 1905 vorgelegt. Hinzu kommen Texte, die wahrend der ersten Kontroverse uber diese Studie in den Jahren 1907 bis 1910 entstanden. Es handelt sich um vier Kritiken und vier Antikritiken. Sie werden ungekurzt prasentiert. Der Band enthalt weitere Texte aus der Zeit von 1905 bis 1910, die in thematischem Zusammenhang mit der Studie stehen, so die Zusammenfassung von Webers Vortrag im Eranos-Kreis aus dem Fruhjahr 1905, seine Skizze `Kirchen` und `Sekten` in Nordamerika aus dem Jahr 1906 und seine Diskussionsbeitrage zu einem Vortrag von Ernst Troeltsch auf dem Ersten Deutschen Soziologentag 1910. Eine Einleitung fuhrt in den problem- und werkgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang der Texte ein, die Editorischen Berichte erlautern insbesondere Webers Auswahl und Nutzung der Quellen. Mehrere Register und ein Glossar erganzen den Band. (shrink)

Problems with the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics date back to attempts by Max Born, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, as well as many others in the 1920s to continue to employ the classical concept of a particle in the context of the quantum world. The experimental observations at the time and the assumption that the classical concept of a particle was to be preserved have led to an enormous literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics and a great deal of (...) confusion then and now among non-physicists and students in any field that involves quantum theory. It is the historical approach to the teaching of quantum mechanics that is at the root of the problem. Spacetime is the arena within which quantum mechanical phenomena take place. For this reason, several Appendices are devoted to the nature of spacetime as well as to topics that can help us understand it such as vacuum fluctuations, the Unruh effect and Hawking radiation. Because of the success of quantum mechanical calculations, those who wish to understand the foundations of the theory are often given the apocryphal advice, "just ignore the issue and calculate". It is hoped that this book will help dispel some of the dismay, frustration, and confusion among those who refuse to take to heart this admonition. (shrink)

""This volume contains the substance of the lectures which were delivered on the Nathaniel William Taylor foundation at the Spring conference of alumni of Yale Divinity School and ministers of Connecticut at New Haven in April, 1912. After they had been delivered, it seemed best to profit by the comments of those who heard them, and to gain the advantage of criticisms on the part of two or three friends who were good enough to read the manuscript. As a (...) result, some minor changes have been made so as to avoid misinterpretation in one or two points; but the substance of the discussion remains practically unchanged. The final lecture of the course, which was too long to be read in its entirety, has been divided and slightly expanded in order to give space for a more detailed exposition."" -- From the Preface. (shrink)

Résumé Le concept de pratique instituante devrait permettre d’explorer de nouvelles voies de la critique institutionnelle. Cette démarche s’appuie d’une part sur le lien qui existe entre les réflexions de Félix Guattari contre la structuralisation et la fermeture de (dans) l’institution, et les thèses de l’anarchiste individualiste Max Stirner, auteur en 1844 de L’Unique et sa propriété, que l’on peut considérer comme un concurrent de Marx et un critique de l’institution aussi radical que précoce. D’autre part, nous établissons un rapport (...) entre la généalogie conceptuelle de la pratique instituante et le concept de pouvoir constituant tel que l’a particulièrement bien développé Antonio Negri. La modalité de l’institution, et en particulier la participation au processus institutionnel, détermine la formation du pouvoir constituant. Cette problématique issue de réflexions sur la théorie constitutionnelle s’applique aussi à l’analyse de certaines pratiques artistiques qui ont traité du problème de l’institution : la théorie brechtienne du théâtre didactique, la création des situations dans la pratique de l’Internationale situationniste, et enfin le processus permanent des pratiques instituantes de Park Fiction, un projet hambourgeois mêlant l’art et la politique, qui depuis une dizaine d’années n’a cessé de déclencher de nouvelles vagues de production collective de désir. (shrink)

Religious nationalism is a complex topic fraught with sensitive questions. Does religion cause violence? Is nationalism a quasi-religion? Are the constant conflicts around the world really about religion, or is religion merely a form of false consciousness? Is religious nationalism primarily a powerful tool that political elites use to manipulate the masses? -/- Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook challenges dominant scholarly works on religious nationalism by identifying the preconceptions that skew analysis of the phenomenon dubbed “religious nationalism.” The book utilizes (...) a multidisciplinary approach that draws insight from theories of nationalism, religious studies, peace research, and political theory, and reframes the questions of religious nationalism within the perspectives of secularism, modernity, and Orientalism. In doing so, the authors enable readers to uncover their own presumptions regarding the role of religion in public life. The work also outlines connections between the analysis of the role of religion in conflict to thoughts regarding how religion may relate to processes of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, and further connects the discussion of religious nationalism to broader conversations on the so-called resurgence of religion. (shrink)

L'idéalisme comprend le devoir moral comme une catégorie éternelle et le formule en lois qui s'adressent aux sentiments de chaque individu. Le matérialisme, au contraire, cherche à expliquer la conscience morale par les conditions sociales et à l’exposer historiquement. L'article ci-dessus donne les grandes lignes d'une telle analyse. Il distingue entre la morale, phénomène de notre temps, l'éthique de l'antiquité et la conception autoritaire du moyen âge. La morale se base essentiellement sur la société bourgeoise, dans laquelle l'intérêt particulier et (...) l’intérêt général sont distincts. L'individu qui, dans l'activité quotidienne, ne recherche que son propre avantage, éprouve à l’appel de sa conscience, le souci de la société. L'auteur démontre ce fait au moyen d'une analyse de l’impératif catégorique de Kant.La morale bourgeoise contient déjà les germes de sa victoire sur elle- même. Elle tend vers une société dans laquelle le devoir et l'intérêt ne seront plus séparés. On retrouve cette tendance non seulement chez Kant, mais encore chez d'autres grands philosophes bourgeois. Les idées de justice, d'égalité et de liberté prennent peu à peu, au fur et à mesure que la société bourgeoise se développe, une autre signification que celle qu'elles paraissent avoir eue au début ; elles exigent aujourd'hui la modification des conditions pour l'introduction desquelles elles ont pourtant été proclamées à l'origine. Cette dialectique est une des raisons de la perplexité actuelle en matière d’idées sur le monde et la vie. Dans l'exposition de cette dialectique, l'auteur montre comment les idées bourgeoises ne vivent plus aujourd'hui dans la pensée idéaliste, mais bien plus dans la pensée matérialiste. Les deux formes principales d’expression de la morale ont actuellement, d’après M. Horkheimer, la pitié et la politique. Elles ne peuvent pas être rationnellement liées l'une à l'autre, mais le sens moral se manifeste dans toutes deux.L'impulsion morale est vivante non seulement dans la vie pratique, mais aussi dans la science. Le matérialisme nie la possibilité d'une science entièrement objective : les intérêts des hommes influencent la recherche scientifique. Il est vrai que ces intérêts, si sublimes qu'ils puissent être, ne sont pas l'émanation d’un sujet libre, comme l'enseigne l'idéalisme, mais la conséquence nécessaire du processus historique. Aussi le matérialisme n’exige- t-il nullement, pour autant que le respect de la vérité reste l'élément de base, le manque de chaque jugement moral dans la science. La croyance du positivisme actuel à la possibilité de faire des constatations affranchies de toute théorie, comme d'ailleurs son aversion envers toute théorie en général, sont dues à ce qu’il ne possède pas lui-même de grandes idées directrices. La théorie naît partout où les connaissances sont sciemment rapportées à un but, c'est-à-dire strictement en relation avec des valeurs de la pratique.Philosophical idealism conceives moral obligation as an eternal category, and formulates it in commandments that appeal to individual sentiment. Philosophical materialism on the other hand, endeavours to explain moral consciousness in terms of social conditions, and to present it in its historical perspective. This essay attempts to furnish the main features for such an analysis. It distinguishes ethics, as a phenomenon of modern times, from that of ancient times, and from the authoritative attitude in the middle ages. Its foundation rests on bourgeois society in which individual and collective interests become sharply separated from each other. The individual, who in his daily work looks to his private interests, experiences through his conscience, concern for the public welfare. H. proves this through his analysis of Kant’s categorical imperative.Bourgeois morality already contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. It indicates a society in which duty and interest are no longer separate. This tendency in ethics becomes manifest, not only in Kant, but also in other great philosophers of bourgeois society. With the development of the latter the ideas of Justice, Equality, and Freedom acquire a content other than that they seem to have possessed in their genesis, and to-day require that change in conditions, to effect which, they were originally introduced. This dialectical process is one of the causes of the present-day philosophical uncertainty. H. shows in his exposition of this dialectical process, how bourgeois ideas are no longer active in idealist thought, but are so in materialist thought.The two main forms in which contemporary ethics expresses itself, are according to H. pity and politics, which cannot indeed, in a rational way, be connected one to the other. Both arise out of a moral sentiment. This moral impulse is active not only in practical life, but also in knowledge. Philosophical materialism denies the possibility of completely objective knowledge : men’s interests find expression also in their cognition. Indeed, however sublime these interests are, they do not spring from „free“ beings, as idealism maintains, but are the necessary results of historical processes.Accordingly, materialism in no way claims for knowledge, freedom from all subjective valuations, but only that a consideration for truth, remain the dominant characteristic. The belief of modern positivism in the possibility of attitudes free from all valuations, as well as its disinclination for all theory, is due to the fact that it possesses no great leading ideas. In all cases is theory vindicated, only when knowledge has a definite aim, that is, when it is related to practical values. (shrink)

Since the outbreak of the First World War, Max Scheler has been interested in political and cultural constellations within Europe. But he also thinks about Europe as a plural entity and its relationship to other world regions. Thus, he analyses processes of globalisation, in his view a Europeanisation of the world, from political, economic and cultural points of view. In his analyses of such a “Europeanisation of the world”, Scheler refers to the great studies on the history of capitalism by (...) Werner Sombart and Max Scheler, from which he takes the talk of the “capitalist spirit of modernity”. Scheler's analysis of globalisation leads to a critique of the European claim to cultural hegemony. He pleads for a preservation of differences and a new vitalisation of cultural values through productive conflicts such as wars on a global scale. Scheler's texts still provoke their readers today, at least to think about them. (shrink)

Kolb's purpose is to dispel a practical and theoretical illusion--promoted by modernity about its own uniqueness as a unified and unifying constellation of meanings which wholly defines us--and to put modernity "in its place" within that sustaining and limiting context which makes it possible, which cannot be described in "standard modern terms," and which suggests that we are not as free as--and yet more than what--modernity says we are. He begins with an examination of the "standard self-description of modernity and (...) its basic dichotomies and divisions," in particular the modern preference for formal over substantive rationality, emphasized by Max Weber in his presentation of modern society as "a process waiting for content to come from the choice of its citizens"--the modern self relating "to itself and to others as a pure chooser, with no necessary substantive content". (shrink)

Simmels Interesse an der Kunstphilosophie geht auf seine Studienzeiten zurück. Bei Hermann GrimmGrimm, Herman und Max JordanJordan, Max hat er kunstgeschichtliche Vorlesungen an der Berliner Universität gehört. Sein spezifisches Interesse an RembrandtsRembrandt van Rijn Kunst bringt er in Briefen an Paul ErnstErnst, Paul und Margarete von Bendemann zum Audruck. Georg Lukács hat es in seinen Erinnerungen an seinen akademischen Lehrer auf den Punkt gebracht: Simmel habe sich den Figuren Goethe, Kant, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer und Rembrandt als Geschichtsphilosoph genähert, „für den jede (...) dieser großen Gestalten zugleich etwas Niewiederkehrend-Einmaliges und eine apriorische Kategorie“ ist. (shrink)

Our ultimate purpose is to give an axiomatic treatment of recursion theory sufficient to develop the priority method. The direct or abstract approach is to keep in mind as clearly as possible the methods actually used in recursion theory, and then to formulate them explicitly. The indirect or experimental approach is to look first for other mathematical theories which seem similar to recursion theory, to formulate the analogies precisely, and then to search for an axiomatic treatment which covers not only (...) recursion theory but also the analogous theories as particular cases.The first approach is more general because it does not depend on the existence of analogues. A concrete mathematical theory, it seems, need have no such analogues and still be important, as e.g. classical number theory. In such a case, an axiomatic treatment may still be useful for exhibiting the mathematical structure of the theory considered and the assumptions on which it rests. However, it will lack one of the most heavily advertised advantages of the axiomatic method, namely, the “economy of thought” which results from an uniform theory for several different and interesting cases: we cannot hope for this if, by hypothesis, we know of only one particular case. In contrast, the second approach, if successful at all, is bound to achieve such “economy” because we start out with several interesting particular cases. Another possible virtue of the second approach is that of field work over insight: the abstract pattern that we are looking for and hoping to formalize in axioms, may not be evident in any one mathematical theory, but may spring to the eye if one happens to look simultaneously at several theories which happen to realize the pattern. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological CategoryMax RosenkrantzThomas Dixon. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 287. Cloth, $60.00Thomas Dixon's From Passions to Emotions defends a provocative set of theses. (1) The concept of "emotion" is of relatively recent vintage, having been designed by secular Scottish writers in the first half (...) of the nineteenth century. (2) That concept embraces a range of phenomena that earlier Christian writers such as Augustine and Aquinas understood in terms of a manifold of concepts such as "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." (3) The concept of "emotion" is too crude an instrument for understanding human psychology. Further, (4) today the secular conceptual framework has completely displaced the religious one. This has nothing to do with the former's greater proximity to the truth, as is shown by the persistence of cogent Christian theories in the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of secularism's triumph; and (5) The opposition between reason and emotion arises only when theorists begin to think of "emotions" rather than "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." Christian writers did not see the passions as simply the enemies of reason.The basis for Dixon's argument is his interpretation of nineteenth-century psychological theory in the English speaking world. Specifically he argues that the concept of "emotion" was invented by the Scottish thinker Thomas Brown (1778-1820). Brown's innovation was then appropriated and developed by Spencer, Darwin, and William James. The foil for this story is the Christian tradition represented most compellingly by Augustine and Aquinas and carried on by a host of lesser nineteenth-century figures. In my judgment, the story thus told cannot bear the weight Dixon places upon it.The centerpiece of Dixon's argument is his claim that Brown "invents" (109) the emotions and thereby initiates a conceptual revolution in western thought. While Dixon may be right in asserting that Brown is the first to use the word 'emotion' in a systematic fashion, this achievement is merely terminological. Brown deploys the term to develop a mechanistic account of human nature, one in which the springs of action are located not in the will and reason, but in the emotions. Replace 'emotion' in the preceding sentence with 'passion' and one gets a concise characterization of Hobbes's view. Dixon is aware that Brown and others work within a Hobbesian framework (250) but does not attend to that framework. Thus his claims for the significance of the developments he describes fail to convince. The real innovation in psychological theory—as in so much else—took place in the seventeenth century.Just as Dixon overestimates the importance and originality of the Scottish writers he discusses, so too he overestimates the intellectual importance of Augustine and Aquinas. His presentation of their views (26-62) is accurate, but he does not note that they take over the Platonic-Aristotelian view of the soul according to which reason can and should penetrate, educate and direct the passions. Thus the guiding thought that structures the work—the nineteenth century witnesses an ultimately successful revolt against Christian psychology—must be rejected. The revolt is against ancient, pre-Christian modes of thought and is undertaken and largely won in the seventeenth century. The events Dixon describes are skirmishes in that larger campaign.The rest of the theses Dixon defends can be dispatched with more quickly. The idea that the modern concept of "emotion" is insufficiently subtle is averted to frequently, but never adequately defended. At no point does Dixon demonstrate, or even claim to demonstrate, that Christian thinkers recognized something secular thinkers miss. Roughly the same can be said for his claims about the persistence of Christian psychology in the nineteenth century. What Dixon means is not just that such thinkers exist, but that their thought remains vibrant. Again I see no argument for such a verdict. Finally, there is the matter of the opposition between reason and passion. To his credit Dixon rejects the view according to which almost all Western thought is hostile to the passions. As he shows, this... (shrink)

We tend to think that the difficulties in bioethics spring from the novel and alarming issues that arise due to discoveries in the new biosciences and biotechnologies. But many of the crucial difficulties in bioethics arise from the assumptions we make about ethics. This paper offers a brief overview of bioethics, and relates ethical ‘principlism’ to ‘ethical fundamentalism’. It then reviews some alternative approaches that have emerged during the second phase of bioethics, and argues for a neo-Aristotelian approach. Misconceptions (...) about ethical principles and ethical reasoning not only distort our views of the business of bioethics, but they also prevent us from facing up to the formidable problems posed by ethical pluralism in so-called liberal societies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Where Are We When We Write? Writing Public Cyberwriting Writing the Distance to the Other Entering the Page: Proximity and Distance Writing Revisited Note References.

Contemporary theories of justice frequently suppose that a legitimate state does not coerce people to comply with values or principles that they could reasonably reject. This ideal of legitimacy is thought to imply neutrality on the good: The State should not coerce people to comply with controversial conceptions of the good (which people could reasonably reject). As Ronald Dworkin puts the point, the government's policies should “be neutral on the question of the good life, or of what gives value to (...) life." Liberal neutrality is sometimes described as a generalization of policies of religious tolerance: Just as the state should be neutral with respect to religious questions, so too the state should be neutral with respect to questions about the good life.". (shrink)

Post-anarchism poses a profound challenge to the fundamental tenets of traditional anarchism, particularly its veneration of science and reason, its overarching narrative of human emancipation, and its reliance on a sanguine conception of innate human goodness. However, this challenge inadvertently erodes the utopian aspirations inherent in traditional anarchism, leaving a conspicuous absence of a tangible alternative. Yet, a sense of utopia remains integral to the impetus for political engagement. This article seeks to address the implicit quandary of political engagement within (...) post-anarchism by examining the works of Max Stirner through the lens of existentialism. By juxtaposing Stirner's notions of involuntary egoism, ownness, the un-man, and insurrection with the philosophical perspectives of Sartre, Camus, and De Beauvoir, we discover that, despite its anti-political inclination, post-anarchism finds solace in the tragic and ceaseless nomadic pursuit of societal amelioration. (shrink)

This article is a comparative theoretical study of authority in the Arab Spring which draws upon the work of Max Weber and Khalil Ahmad Khalil, and examines the theoretical importance of a shift away from authority understood along the lines of single, charismatic individuals. I argue that the central implication of the lack of dominant leaders in the Arab Spring is the potential for the growth of a popular form of charismatic authority. This popular understanding of charisma would (...) have several important consequences for building a more broadly inclusive arrangement of democratic rule. First, it would allow for the self-realization of ordinary citizens in a way that was not possible in an authoritarian setting, where popular aspirations and demands were realized only abstractly, if not simply denied, by being invested in the figure of an ‘inspirational leader.’ This self-realization relies upon an important reversal of an image of Arab publics as incapable of self-governance. Second, it would signal a shi... (shrink)

Max Planck introduced the concept of zero-point energy in spring 1911. In the early struggles to establish the concept of the energy-quantum, it provided a helpful heuristic principle, to guide as well as supplement the efforts of some leading physicists in understanding the laws that applied in the atomic domain. The history and growth of this concept, and its application in the general development of quantum theory during the past many decades are studied under three principal headings: (1) The (...) Birth of the Concept of zero-Point Energy; (2) Does Zero-Point Energy Really Exist? and (3) The Ground State of Quantum Systems. (shrink)

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

This excellent, semi-technical account includes a review of classical physics (origin of space and time measurements, Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy, laws of motion, inertia, and more) and coverage of Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity, discussing the concept of simultaneity, kinematics, Einstein’s mechanics and dynamics, and more.

This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must put (...) their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

In daily life we take it for granted that our minds have conscious control of our actions, at least for most of the time. But many scientists and philosophers deny that this is really the case, because there is no generally accepted theory of how the mind interacts with the body. Max Velmans presents a non-reductive solution to the problem, in which ‘conscious mental control’ includes ‘voluntary’ operations of the preconscious mind. On this account, biological determinism is compatible with experienced (...) free will. Velmans’ theory is put to the test by nine critics: Ron Chrisley, Todd Feinberg, Jeffrey Gray, John Kihlstrom, Sam Rakover, Ramakrishna Rao, Aaron Sloman, Steve Torrance andRobert Van Gulick, followed by Velmans' reply. (shrink)

I propose an argument for the thesis that laws of nature are necessary in the sense of holding in all worlds sharing the properties of the actual world, on the basis of a principle I propose to call the Causal Criterion of Reality . The CCR says: for an entity to be real it is necessary and sufficient that it is capable to make a difference to causal interactions. The crucial idea here is that the capacity to interact causally - (...) or to contribute to determining causal interactions - is not only the ultimate metaphysical ground for the existence of an entity, but it also provides a criterion for determining the nature of that entity, i.e. its properties. The alternative is to conceive of laws of nature as contingent: they could be different from what they are like in the actual world, where that possibility is understood to be metaphysical, not only epistemic. For the sake of this paper, I shall accept Armstrong's thesis that laws of nature are relations between universals. I also follow Armstrong in the view that both the existence and the properties of particulars are metaphysically independent of the existence and identity of other particular. However, what is controversial and what I shall challenge is his thesis that universals are like particulars in the following respect: according to Armstrong, each universal is a logically distinct entity whose existence and identity is independent of the existence and identity of other universals. My aim in this paper is to show that the identity of a universal is entirely determined by its lawful relations to other universals. The crucial premise I use is the thesis that the CCR is a universal criterion, which applies both to particulars and universals. From the thesis that the identity of a universal is exclusively determined by laws, it follows that laws are necessary in the sense that they cannot differ without the universals they link also being different. This creates a difficulty for those authors who, as Armstrong, accept the CCR but nevertheless defend the view that laws are contingent. (shrink)

These essays, written between 1949 and 1967, focus on a single theme: the triumph in the twentieth century of the state-bureaucratic apparatus and ‘instrumental reason’ and the concomitant liquidation of the individual and the basic social institutions and relationships associated with the individual.

Many environmentalists believe that religion has been a major contributor to our ecological crisis, for Judeo-Christians have been taught that they have dominion over the earth and so do not consider themselves part of a biotic community. In this book a philosopher of environmental ethics acknowledges that religion may contribute to environmental problems but argues that religion can also play an important role in solving these problems―that religion can provide an ethical context that will help people to become sensitive to (...) the environment and to elect leaders who are genuinely responsive to the ecological crisis. Examining a broad range of Western religious traditions―from conservative Christianity and orthodox Judaism to Goddess feminism and nature religion―Max Oelschlaeger provides a sociolinguistic analysis of their creation stories and finds environmentally positive aspects in each of them. He asserts that religious discourse in the public arena can offer a way for such environmental issues as biodiversity, pollution, and population to be addressed outside the realm of special-interest politics. And he urges local churches to make "caring for creation" a theme for worship in their services; the majority of Americans, says Oelschlaeger, will discover an environmental ethic only through their religious faith. (shrink)